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In this paper I analyze whether restrictions to capital mobility reduce vulnerability to external shocks.
More specifically, I ask if countries that restrict the free flow of international capital have a lower
probability of experiencing a large contraction in net capital flows. I use three new indexes on the
degree of international financial integration and a large multi-country data set for 1970-2004 to estimate
a series of random-effect probit equations.  I find that the marginal effect of higher capital mobility
on the probability of a capital flow contraction is positive and statistically significant, but very small.
Having a flexible exchange rate greatly reduces the probability of experiencing a capital flow contraction.
The benefits of flexible rates increase as the degree of capital mobility increases.  A higher current
account deficit increases the probability of a capital flow contraction, while a higher ratio of FDI to
GDP reduces that probability.
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I.  Introduction 
The East Asian currency crises of 1997-1998 were extremely traumatic.  
Countries that for years had been praised as examples of how to conduct economic policy 
were subject to abrupt stops of capital inflows and had to devalue their currencies.  As the 
crisis deepened, contagion spread to other emerging nations, affecting countries as far as 
Latin America.  In many ways, the East Asian crises marked the end of an era; in the 
years that followed, macroeconomic policies in most emerging countries went through 
profound changes.  Perhaps the most important of these changes is that most countries 
gave up pegged exchange rate regimes and adopted some form of flexible exchange rates.  
Indeed, very few countries have rigid exchange rates; at the time of this writing China 
continues to be the most important cases of exchange rate inflexibility.  
It is not an exaggeration to say that the East Asian and subsequent crises -- Brazil, 
Turkey, Argentina, Uruguay, the Dominican Republic – resulted in the emergence of a 
new (and more prudent) approach towards macroeconomic policy in emerging and 
transition nations.  The overall objective of this new approach is to reduce vulnerability 
to external shocks and to lower the likelihood of external crises, including sudden stops 
and major devaluations.  This new view on macro policy has also recognized the need of 
maintaining the public and external debts at prudent levels.  In addition, the accumulation 
of international reserves has been used as a self insurance mechanism, and current 
account deficits have generally been kept in check.
1   
In spite of the emergence of a new view on macroeconomic policy, there are still 
some areas of disagreement.  The most important one refers to the appropriate degree of 
capital mobility in emerging and transition countries.  Some authors argue that limiting 
the extent of international financial integration reduces speculation and helps countries 
withstand external shocks without suffering massive crises.  According to this view, 
countries that control and limit capital mobility are less likely to suffer contagion from 
abroad.  In his criticism of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Stiglitz (2002) argues 
that the fundamental reason why India and China were spared from substantial currency 
crises -- and were not subject to contagion from the East Asian or other crises of the 
                                                            
1  The evolution of this new approach to macro policy in emerging nations may be traced through the 
writings of a number of authors.  See, for example, Summers (2000), Fischer (2003), Dornbusch (2002),  
Aizenman and Lee (2005), and Rogoff, Reinhart and Savastanno (2003).  See also Rogoff (2006).        2 
1990s and early 2000s -- is that they did not allow free capital mobility.  Stiglitz goes as 
far as arguing that the easing of controls on capital mobility was at the center of most 
modern currency crises in the emerging markets -- Mexico 1994, East Asia 1997, Russia 
1998, Brazil 1999, Turkey 2001, and Argentina 2002.   According to other authors, 
however, restrictions to capital mobility are ineffective -- the private sector always finds 
way of circumventing them --, introduce costly microeconomic distortions and encourage 
corruption.
2  What makes the debate on capital controls particularly interesting is that 
some of the critics of free capital mobility in the emerging countries are authors that have 
been staunch supporters of free trade in goods: according to them there are fundamental 
differences between markets for goods and markets for securities (Bhagwati, 1998, 
1999).   
  The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether restrictions on capital mobility 
reduce a country’s vulnerability to major external shocks.  More specifically, I ask if 
countries that restrict the free flow of international capital are less likely to experiencing 
an abrupt reduction in net capital inflows.  I use three new indexes on the degree of 
international financial integration and a large multi-country data set for 1970-2004 to 
estimate a series of random-effect probit equations.  I use these estimates to compute 
marginal effects of different indicators on the likelihood of a country facing a severe 
contraction in net capital flows.  I also analyze the role played by other variables in 
determining the probability of experiencing a capital inflow contraction.  In particular, I 
focus on: (a) large current account deficits; (b) the exchange rate regime – fixed or 
flexible; (c) holdings of international reserves; (d) fiscal imbalances; (e) world interest 
rates; and (f) the composition of capital inflows, among others.  Throughout the analysis I 
focus on nonlinearities, and on the interaction between the degree of financial integration 
and other determinants of macroeconomic vulnerability.   
The analysis concentrates on what I have called “capital flow contractions” (CFC) 
episodes.  A CFC is defined as an abrupt decline -- at least 3% of GDP – in net capital 
inflows during a one year period.  CFCs differ from the more traditional concept of 
“sudden stop” (SS) in an important respect.  Sudden stops are large contractions in flows 
to countries that, until that moment, were receiving large positive (net) flows; CFCs, in 
                                                            
2  Forbes (2006 a,b).        3 
contrast, are defined for all countries, independently of whether they initially had positive 
or negative net flows.  That is, it is possible for a CFC to take place in a country that was 
originally experiencing net capital outflows.  In that regard, then, CFCs also capture 
surges in what is sometimes referred to as “capital flight.”  The reason for concentrating 
on CFCs is that any abrupt contraction of the capital account – independently of whether 
the country is initially subject to net inflows or outflows – will require a major current 
account adjustment and, thus, is likely to be costly.
 3  It follows from the definition of 
CFC and SS that the incidence of the former will be larger than that of the latter.           
Before proceeding, it is important to emphasize that the analysis presented in this 
paper only deals with one aspect of the effects of capital controls: their impact on the 
probability of experiencing a large decline in net capital inflows.  A complete policy 
evaluation of the effects of capital controls would also analyze their costs in the form of 
distortions, misallocated investment and others.  However, dealing with the (potential) 
costs of capital account restrictions, is beyond the scope of this paper.
4  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section II I describe the three 
indexes on capital account restrictions used in this paper, and I compare them to 
alternative measures used in the literature.  In Section III I define capital flow 
contractions (CFCs) and I briefly discuss their incidence across different regions during 
the 1970-2004 period.  I also provide a brief comparison of CFCs with the more 
traditional measure of sudden stops.  In Section IV I report results on the determinants of 
the probability of experiencing a CFC.  The analysis concentrates on nonlinearities, and 
investigates the way in which capital mobility affects the role of other determinants of 
CFCs.  In Section V I investigate the relationship between capital mobility, contagion, 
large current account imbalances and exchange rate regimes.  In this Section I also deal 
with extensions and robustness, and I discuss in greater detail interactive effects between 
capital mobility and other determinants of the probability of CFCs.  In Section VI I deal 
with the potential endogeneity of the capital mobility indexes, and I present results 
                                                            
3  On sudden stops, see Calvo(2003), Calvo et al (2004), Caballero And Krishnamurthy (2002, 2003), 
Frankel and Cavallo (2004), Edwards (2004a,b), Hutchinson and Noy (2005). See also the discussion in 
Rothenberg and Warnock (2006).    
4  See the papers by Forbes mentioned above.  See also Desai et al (2004).        4 
obtained when an instrumental variables version of probit regressions is used.  Finally, in 
Section VII I provide some concluding remarks.  The paper also has a data appendix. 
II.  Measuring Capital Mobility  
Literature Review:  Most early attempts to measure the extent of international 
financial integration used information provided by the International Monetary Fund.  The 
standard approach has been to use line E.2 of the annual summary published in the 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.  Alesina, Grilli and 
Milesi-Ferreti (1994) and Rodrik (1998) constructed a dummy variable index of capital 
controls, which took a value of one when capital controls were in place and zero otherwise.  
Klein and Olivei (1999) used the IMF’s data to construct an index as the number of years in 
the period 1986 and 1995 during which each country had an open capital account.
 5  
Leblang (1997), Razin and Rose (1994), Chinn and Ito (2002), Glick and Hutchinson 
(2005), and Glick, Guo and Hutchinson (2005) also used indicators based on the IMF to 
construct zero-one classifications of openness.   
A limitation of these IMF-based binary indexes is that they do not distinguish 
between de jure and de facto controls, and do not differentiate according to different 
intensities of capital restrictions, or type of flow being restricted.  Montiel and Reinhart 
(1999) and Chinn and Ito (2002) addressed this issue by combining IMF and country-
specific information to construct indexes on the intensity of capital controls in a number of 
countries.   
In an effort to deal with some of these measurement problems, Quinn (1997) 
constructed a comprehensive set of cross country indicators on the degree of capital 
mobility that ranged from 0 through 4.  These indexes covered several years, allowing 
researchers to investigate how changes in capital controls affected key macroeconomic 
variables.  Edwards (1999, 2002) used Quinn’s index to analyze whether restricted capital 
controls affected growth.  He found that there was a threshold effect: higher capital 
mobility benefit countries only after they have reached a certain level of economic 
development.   Edison et al (2004) compared Quinn’s (1997) index with an index based 
on the number of years that, according to the Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
                                                            
5   A limitation with this indicator is that it does not say if the index’s number (i.e. the percentage of years 
with restrictions) refers to most recent or most distant years in the time window being considered.        5 
Restrictions, a country has had a closed capital account, and found out that for most (but 
not all) countries and periods there was a correspondence between the two indicators.  
More recently Quinn et al (2003) and Quinn (2003) developed a new index that provides 
greater detail on the intensity of controls.  Mody and Murshid (2002) also used IMF data 
as the bases for an index of financial integration that covers 150 countries for 1966-2000, 
and is tabulated from a value of zero to four.   
A number of authors have used stock market data to construct indexes on 
international financial integration.  Early attempts were made by Bekaert (1995), Bekaert 
and Harvey (1995, 2000), and Bekaert et al (2005).  According to these authors it is 
important to distinguish between “official” or “legislative” dates of stock market 
liberalization.  Edison and Warnock (2003) used data on stock markets compiled by the 
International Finance Corporation to construct a new index of restrictions on ownership 
of stock by foreigners.  This index – which is available for 29 countries – has a high 
degree of correlation with the index by Bekaert et al (2005).
6  Shatz (2000) built an index 
on capital account restrictions based on restrictions on foreign direct investment in 57 
countries.  Desai et al (2004) used this index in a study on the way in which multinational 
firms deal with capital controls. 
  These difficulties in measuring capital mobility and financial integration 
accurately have resulted in empirical results that have often been tentative, and not very 
robust.  It is not an exaggeration to say that for some time now macroeconomists have 
tried to obtain better and more detailed indexes of capital account restrictions and 
financial integration. 
Three New Indexes:  In this paper I use three new indexes on the degree of 
international financial integration.   
·  I constructed the first index – which I call Capital Mobility or CM -- by 
combining information from Quinn (2003) and Mody and Murshid (2002), 
with information from country-specific sources.  In creating this new 
index I followed a three steps procedure:  First, the scales of the Quinn 
and Mody and Murshid indexes were made compatible.  The new index 
                                                            
6 See Edison et. al (2004) for a survey of studies on the effect of capital account restrictions on stock 
markets.        6 
has a scale from 0 to 100, where higher numbers denote a higher degree 
of capital mobility; a score of 100 denotes absolutely free capital mobility.  
Second, I use Stata’s “impute” procedure to deal with missing 
observations in the new index.  In order to impute preliminary values to 
the missing observations I use data on the two original indexes (Quinn and 
Mody and Murshid), their lagged values, openness as measured by import 
tariffs collections over imports, the extent of trade openness measured as 
imports plus exports over GDP, a measure of openness obtained from the 
fitted values of a gravity model of trade and GDP per capita.
7  In the third 
step, I use country-specific data to revise and refine the preliminary data 
created using the “impute” procedure discussed above.  The new index 
covers the period 1970-2004, and has data for 163 countries (although not 
every country has data for every year).
8 
·  The second index is constructed from data on international assets positions 
compiled by Lane and Milesi Ferreti (2006) for 147 countries for 1970 to 
2004.  This index is computed as the sum of total external assets plus total 
external liabilities as a proportion of GDP.  A higher value of this index – 
which I call LMF – denotes that the country is more integrated to world 
financial markets.  In some ways this index is a financial or capital 
markets counterpart of the traditional index on trade openness calculated 
as the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP.  
·  The third index was constructed by Miniane (2004) for 34 countries.  It is 
based on detailed country-specific data compiled by the IMF since 1996, 
and considers 13 types of capital controls and restrictions, including 
restrictions on that affect inflows and outflows of stocks, money market 
instruments, mutual funds, derivatives, commercial credits, warrants, 
letters of credit, direct investment, profit repatriation, and real estate 
                                                            
7 See Aizenman and Noy (2004) on the relationship between trade account openness and capital account 
openness. 
8  It is important to note that although this new index represents an improvement over alternative indexes, it 
still has some shortcomings, including the fact that it does not distinguish very sharply between restrictions 
on capital inflows and restrictions on capital outflows.  See the discussion in the preceding section for an 
analysis of the shortcomings of different indexes.  See also Eichengreen (2001) and Edwards (1999).        7 
transactions.  Miniane (2004) used country-specific primary data to 
recalculate this index all the way back to 1983.  This index – which I call 
Miniane or simply MI – ranges from zero to 100, and is calculated at the 
three-decimal level.
9  A higher value of this index denotes a higher level 
of capital account restrictions.     
 
There are some important differences across these indexes.  First, while the 
Capital Mobility and Miniane indexes are based on an analysis of de jure restrictions, the 
LMF index relies on de facto market integration.  A second difference refers to coverage.  
The Capital Mobility and LMF indexes cover a longer period of time and larger number 
of countries than the Miniane index; in that regard, the CM and LMF indexes are 
preferred to the MI index.  A third difference is that while in the Capital Controls and 
LMF indexes a higher value denotes a higher degree of capital mobility, in Miniane a 
higher value of the  index refers to stricter capital controls.  An important question is 
whether, in overall terms, these three indexes tell a similar story.  I address this issue by 
computing Spearman rank coefficients of correlation.  The null hypotheses that the 
indexes are independent were rejected at conventional levels.  The Spearman coefficient 
between Capital Mobility and Miniane it is -0.880 ; between LMF and MI it is -0.660; 
and between the CM and LMF indexes is 0.430.   Given their more general coverage, in 
the rest of this paper I concentrate on the CM and LF indexes.  
III.  Capital Flow Contractions:  Definition and Incidence    
  In this paper I have defined a “capital flow contraction” (CFC) episode as an 
abrupt contraction in a country’s capital account in a given year.  More specifically, in 
order for an episode to classify as a CFC, net capital flows have to decline in a year by at 
least 3% of GDP.  A country could face a CFC independently of whether it was initially a 
net importer or a net exporter of capital.  The more traditional concept of sudden stop, on 
the other hand, is restricted to abrupt declines in capital inflows to countries that were 
previously receiving large inflows of capital. As pointed out above, the reason for 
concentrating on CFCs is that any abrupt contraction of the capital account – 
independently of whether the country is initially subject to net inflows or outflows – will 
                                                            
9  The original index went from zero to one; I rescaled it.        8 
require a major current account adjustment and, thus, is likely to be costly.
  In Section V 
of this paper I show that the main results are similar if the more traditional definition of 
sudden stops is used in the analysis.     
The first two columns of Table 1 provide summary data on the incidence of CFCs 
for six groups of countries.  As may be seen, the overall incidence of CFCs is 0.18; the 
Middle East and Eastern Europe have the highest incidence, while the advanced nations 
have the lowest incidence.  The 
2 c  test is for the null hypothesis that the distribution of 
“CFCs” and “no CFCs” is independent across group of countries; this null hypothesis is 
rejected at conventional levels.  In the last two columns of Table 1, and for comparison 
purposes, I present data on the incidence of sudden stops for the same six groups of 
countries.  I have defined a “sudden stop” episode as an abrupt and major reduction in 
capital inflows to a country that, up to that time, had been receiving large volumes of 
foreign capital.  More specifically, I imposed the following requirements for an episode 
to qualify as a “sudden stop”:  (1) the country must have received an inflow of capital 
(relative to GDP) larger than its region’s third quartile during the two years prior to the 
“sudden stop.”  And (2), net capital inflows must have declined by at least 3% of GDP in 
one year.  As may be seen, the overall incidence is 0.087, less than half of that of CFCs.  
The Middle East and Latin America have the highest occurrences of SS, while the 
advanced nations have the lowest.   
 In the extensions reported in Section IV I discuss alternative definitions of capital 
flows disruptions, including definitions that consider more severe reductions in flows, 
definitions that spread the decline in capital flows over two years, as well as a definition 
that focuses on sudden stops proper.   
IV.       An Empirical Analysis of Capital Controls and Capital Flow Contractions  
  In this Section I investigate whether the degree of international financial 
integration affects the probability of a capital flow contraction (CFC).  I am particularly 
interested in analyzing the way in which capital mobility affects the role played by other 
variables – including contagion, the degree of flexibility of the nominal exchange rate, 
and external imbalances – in determining the probability of a CFC.  
 
        9 
IV.1  The Empirical Model 
  The point of departure of the analysis is a variance component probit model given 
by equations (1) and (2):     
 
1,    if   , 0
* > tj y  
(1)    tj y         =       
        0,  otherwise.    
 
 
(2)   
*
tj y    =     tj tj e aw + . 
 
Variable  tj y  is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if country j in period t 
experienced a CFC (as defined above), and zero if the country in question did not 
experience a CFC.
 10  According to equation (1), whether the country experiences a 
capital flow contraction is assumed to be the result of an unobserved latent variable
*
tj y .  
*
tj y , in turn, is assumed to depend linearly on vector tj w .  The error term  tj e is given by a 
variance component model:   . tj j tj m n e + =    j n is iid with zero mean and variance
2
n s ; 
tj m is normally distributed with zero mean and variance  1
2 = m s .  In addition to the 
random effects model, I also estimated fixed effects and basic probit versions of the 
probit model in equations (1) and (2).
11   
  One of the advantages of probit models is that they are highly non-linear; the 
marginal effect of any independent variable on the probability is conditional on the 
values of all covariates.  This means that if the value of one of the independent variables 
changes, the marginal effect of all of them will also change.  Denoting the (normal) 
cumulative probability distribution by F, then the probit model is defined by:  
 
                                                            
10   Glick and Hutchinson (2005) investigated whether capital controls isolated countries from currency 
crises.  There measure of controls is a zero-one indicator, however.  
11  In the “basic probit” estimation, the error term is assumed to have the standard characteristics.          10 
(3)    ) ( ) | 0 Pr( jt jt jt y aw w F = ¹   
 
The marginal effect of a particular variable 1 z on the probability may be calculated as the 
slope of the probability function, evaluated at a specific set of values of the covariates 
s jt w .  Assume that the estimated probit coefficient of  1 z is  1 a , and that we want to 
evaluate the marginal effect of  1 z  at a point where covariates have values captured by 
vector w ~.  In this case, the marginal effect of  1 z  (evaluated at w ~) is given by: 
 
(4)    . ) ~ ( ' 1
1






Equation (4) may be used to evaluate how a change in particular variable – a “large” 
current account deficit, say – affects the probability of a CFC, under alternative degrees 
of capital mobility (captured by different values ofw ~).  In this paper I calculate the 
marginal effects of the different covariates for alternative degrees of capital mobility-- 
high, intermediate and low – and different levels of current account imbalances.  
IV.2  Specification 
In determining the specification of this probit model I followed the literature on 
external crises, devaluations, sudden stops, and current account reversals.
12 In the base-
case specification I included the following covariates, all of which are available for a 
large number of countries and years:
13  
·  The capital mobility index(es) described above, lagged one period.  As 
pointed out, the sign (and magnitude) of this coefficient is at the center of 
current policy debates on the effects of capital mobility.  If, as some authors 
such as Stiglitz (2002) have argued, restricting capital mobility reduces the 
likelihood of a crisis, the sign of the capital mobility index would be positive 
for the CM and LMF indexes; for the MI index the coefficient should be 
negative. 
                                                            
12  See, for example, Calvo et al (2004), Glick and Hutchison (2005), Edwards (2004a, 2004b), and Frankel 
and Cavallo (2004).  See also Eichengreen et al (2006). 
13  See, for example, Frankel and Rose (1996), Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (2000) and Edwards (2002).        11 
·  The ratio of the current account deficit to GDP, lagged one period.  
·  The lagged ratio of the country’s fiscal deficit relative to GDP.   
·  The lagged value of an index that measures the (potential) effect of 
“contagion.”  This contagion index is defined as the relative occurrence of 
CFCs in each country’s “reference group.” The reference group, in turn, is 
defined for most countries as their region.  There are five geographical 
regions:  Latin America, Asia, North Africa and the Middle East, Africa and 
Eastern and Central Europe.  The advanced countries belong to a group of 
their own.  The contagion variable is calculated, for each year, as the 
percentage of countries, in the relevant group, that experienced a CFC.  In this 
calculation data for the country in question are excluded.  The coefficient of 
this “contagion” variable in the probit equation is expected to be positive, 
reflecting the fact that when a similar country experiences a capital flow 
contraction, capital flows to the country in question will tend to decline, 
increasing the likelihood of a CFC.
14  A particularly interesting question – and 
one that I address in some detail in this paper – is how different degrees of 
capital mobility affect a country’s vulnerability to contagion.  
·  Percentage change in the terms of trade (defined as the ratio of export prices 
to import prices), with a one year lag.  Improved terms of trade are expected 
to lower the probability of a crisis; its coefficient should be negative. 
·  Lagged international real interest rates, proxied by real U.S. 10 year 
Treasuries.  As Eichengreen (2001) has argued, a decline in world liquidity – 
captured by higher international real interest rates – will tend to increase the 
probability of an external crisis.  If this is indeed the case, the coefficient of 
this variable will be positive.      
·  A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the country is an “advanced 
country,” and zero otherwise.  In some of the regressions I included dummy 
variables for each region.   
                                                            
14  There are six groups.  Five of them are strictly regional – Latin America, Asia, Middle East and North 
Africa, Eastern and Central Europe, and Africa --, while the sixth refers to “advanced” nations and, thus, 
covers more than a region.          12 
·  A dummy variable that takes the value of one if that particular country has a 
flexible exchange rate regime, and zero otherwise.  The classification of 
exchange rate regimes is based on de facto information, as compiled by Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003). 
·  Foreign direct investment (FDI) relative to GDP.  This variable measures the 
composition of capital inflows.  To the extent that FDI represents a longer 
term commitment than portfolio capital flows, it is expected that its coefficient 
will be negative. 
·  International reserves as a proportion of the country’s total external liabilities.  
This indicator was constructed from data provided by Lane and Milesi-Ferreti 
(2006).  To the extent that a high level of international reserves is seen as an 
insurance policy, the coefficient of this variable is expected to be negative in 
the estimation of the probit equations.  
 
In addition to the base estimates with the covariates discussed above, I also 
estimated a number of regressions that include an index that measures the extent to which 
the country is dollarized.  If countries subject to “original sin” – that is, countries that are 
unable to borrow in their own currency are more prone to experience an abrupt decline in 
capital inflows, its coefficient should be positive.  The data for this index were taken 
from Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003).    
  Previous work that has analyzed the effects of financial openness on sudden stops 
has found inconclusive results.  Edwards (2004, 2005), for instance, found an 
insignificant coefficient in the estimation of the probit component of treatment 
regressions.  However, his measures of capital flows declines were different from those 
used in this paper; also, he used a smaller sample, and a different index of capital 
mobility from the ones used in this paper. Frankel and Cavallo (2004) found a negative 
relationship between openness and the probability of a sudden stop.  Calvo et al (2004), 
on the other hand, report a positive effect.   
IV.3  Basic Results 
The basic results are in Tables 2-4; each table contains the estimates for a 
different index of capital mobility.  As may be seen, most estimated coefficients are        13 
significant at conventional levels.  The capital mobility indexes are statistically 
significant in all the equations, and their signs indicate that, with other things given, an 
increase in the degree of international financial integration increases the probability of a 
CFC.  The fact that these results hold for three very different indexes of capital mobility 
indicate an important degree of robustness.  However, as is discussed in great detail in 
Sub-Section IV.4, the quantitative impact of changes in capital mobility on the estimated 
probabilities of a CFC is very small small, almost negligible.  An important question is 
whether different degrees of capital mobility affect the way in which other covariates, 
such as contagion, the exchange rate regime and external imbalances, affect the 
probability of a CFC. 
The results in Tables 2-4 indicate that a higher current account deficit increases 
the probability of a CFC.  The results confirm the presence of a “contagion” effect, and 
indicate that an improvement in the terms of trade reduces the probability of a CFC.
15  As 
is discussed below, the actual magnitude of the contagion effect changes with the degree 
of capital mobility. The results in Tables 2-4 also show that countries with a flexible 
exchange rate regime have a lower probability of experiencing a CFC, as do advanced 
nations.  More stringent global liquidity – captured by higher international real interest 
rates – increases the probability of a CFC.  The results in Tables 2-4 also indicate that the 
composition of capital flows matter: higher FDI (as a proportion of GDP) reduces the 
probability of a CFC.  Interestingly, a higher stock of international reserves does not 
reduce the likelihood of experiencing a large contraction in net capital inflows.       
In equations (2.6), (3.6), (4.6) the coefficient of the fiscal deficit is significantly 
positive, indicating that a higher fiscal imbalance increases the likelihood of a capital 
flow contraction.  However, when the fiscal variable is introduced jointly with the current 
account deficit – equation (2.3), (3.3) and (4.3) --, its coefficient is not significant.  As 
may be seen, in this case the coefficient of the current account deficit continues to be 
positive and significant.  This result is rather intuitive: higher fiscal imbalances that are 
not associated with a deterioration of the external accounts, do not affect in a significant 
way the probability of an abrupt contraction in net capital inflows.   
                                                            
15  The contagion results contrasts with the findings from Glick and Hutchinson (2005) for currency crises.  
Notice, however, that their measure of contagion differs from the one used in this paper.  In their case the 
contagion indicator is binary.         14 
Finally, when other covariates, such as the degree of dollarization were 
introduced in the probit regression, their coefficients were not significant.
16  Since the 
coverage of the Miniane index is narrower – both in terms of countries and time period – 
than the two other measures of mobility, in the rest of the paper I will concentrate on the 
CM and LMF indexes. 
IV.4  Evaluating the Marginal Effect of Capital Mobility on the Probability of CFC 
  In order to gain further insights into the way in which the different covariates 
affect the probability of a CFC, in this Section I report marginal effects computed using 
the procedure sketched in equations (3) and (4).  I discuss the marginal effects for only 
one of the equations reported above -- equation 2.2.
17   
  As a point of departure for the analysis I evaluated the marginal effects for three 
different degrees of capital mobility:  low, intermediate, and high.  The marginal effects 
for “low capital mobility” were evaluated at a value of the Capital Mobility index 
corresponding to 12.5; all other independent variables were taken at their mean values.  
The results for “intermediate capital mobility” were calculated when all covariates, 
including the CM index, were at their mean values; and the marginal effects for “high 
capital mobility” were calculated at a value of the CM index of 100, which corresponds to 
the 95
th percentile of its distribution; as before, all other independent variables were 
maintained at their mean values.   
  These three sets of marginal effects are reported in Table 5; the bottom row 
includes the estimated probability of experiencing a CFC.  Several results stand out from 
this Table:   
·  According to the probit estimate, a “typical” country – that is a country with 
covariate values equal to the sample mean – has an estimated probability of 
experiencing a CFC of 16.5% (the actual historical incidence of CFC episodes is 
18.8%).  This estimated probability increases to 21.6% in a country with a “high” 
                                                            
16  Detailed results are not reported here due to space considerations.  However, they are available on 
request. 
17  When alternative equations were used, the results on the marginal effects were similar.  This equation 
was chosen for calculating the marginal effects because it has the preferred specification and covers a large 
number of countries.  When the probit regressions with the LMF index were used to evaluate the marginal 
effects, the results were also similar.  The marginal effects obtained from the probits with the MI index 
were somewhat different.  This is not surprising, as the MI index is available for a shorter period and a 
limited sample of countries.         15 
degree of capital mobility, and declines to 12.3% for a country with a “low” 
degree of capital mobility.   
·  The point estimates of the marginal effects for the Capital Mobility indexes are 
very low: according to Column (5.1), when the initial condition is a low degree of 
financial integration, a marginal increase in the CM index raises the probability of 
a CFC by a mere 0.1%.  The marginal effect of the CM index barely changes 
when it is evaluated at higher levels of capital mobility.  This means that, 
although capital mobility has a statistically significant effect on the probability of 
a CFC, the magnitude of this effect is so small, that it is almost of no practical or 
policy consequence.  A potentially more interesting question, and one that I 
discuss below, is whether the marginal effects of other covariates changes for 
different values of the CM index.  
·  The effect of moving from a pegged to a flexible exchange rate regime is 
negative, large, and statistically significant. Countries that adopt a flexible 
exchange rate regime reduce the probability of experiencing a CFC between 5.7% 
and 8.4%.  What is particularly interesting is that this marginal effect becomes 
more negative with higher degrees of capital mobility.  That is, the advantage of 
having a flexible exchange rate increases significantly in countries with a higher 
degree of capital mobility.  
·  “Contagion” has a significantly positive marginal effect on the probability of a 
CFC.  Point estimates, however, are very small.  For a typical country, a one 
percentage point increase in the contagion index, results in an increase in the 
probability of a CFC of only 0.28%.  Notice, however, that in spite of its low 
point estimate, the marginal effect of “contagion” increases as the degree of 
financial integration goes up: it is 0.23% for low capital mobility, and 0.33% for 
high mobility.  Figure 1 presents the point estimates, as well as one standard 
deviation bands, for the “contagion” marginal effect coefficient corresponding to 
different values of the Capital Mobility index.   
·  The marginal effects of current account deficits are significantly positive, but 
small.  Moreover, and in contrast with the cases of exchange rate regime and        16 
contagion, the marginal effect of current account deficits don’t experience a 
significant change when the degree of capital mobility increases.   
·  Improvements in the terms of trade reduce the probability of a CFC.  At the 
margin, however, the effects are not very large; the marginal effects are very 
similar across different degrees of capital mobility.  The p-values are slightly 
higher than the conventional 0.10 level. 
·  A marginal decline in world liquidity – captured by an increase in real world 
interest rates – has a small positive effect on the probability of a CFC.  The 
marginal effect is never higher than 1%. 
·  Being an advanced nation reduces the probability of a CFC between 2.5% and 
3.5%. 
 
  To summarize, the results in Table 5 indicate that, although statistically 
significant, the direct marginal effect of capital mobility on the probability of a CFC is 
very small – almost negligible.  This is true for every level of capital mobility.  However, 
the degree of capital mobility has an important indirect effect on the probability of a 
CFC, since it affects the importance of other determinants of this probability.  In 
particular, the advantage of a flexible exchange rate is higher in countries with a high 
degree of capital mobility than in countries with low mobility.  The marginal effect of 
contagion increases as the degree of capital mobility goes up.   
V.  Capital Controls and Macroeconomic Vulnerability  
  The results discussed in the previous Section were obtained by evaluating the 
marginal effects at the mean values of all covariates, except the Capital Mobility index.   
In that regard, these results refer to a “typical country” with different degrees of financial 
integration.  From a policy perspective, however, a more relevant question is whether 
controls on capital mobility reduce the probability of a CFC in vulnerable countries.  In 
this Section I expand the analysis in order to address this issue.  In Sub-Section V.1 I 
analyze the relationship between the degree of capital mobility and CFC in countries with 
large current account deficits and fixed exchange rates.  In V.2 I analyze in greater detail 
the role of contagion, and I ask whether the relevant concept of contagion is “regional” or 
“global.”  In Section V.3 I discuss some extensions, I consider alternative definitions of        17 
capital account disturbances, and I deal with robustness.  Finally, in Sub-Section V.4 I 
deal with issues related to the specification of the probit equation, and I discuss the 
possible role of terms that interact two covariates.  Issues related to the possible 
endogeneity of the capital mobility indexes are taken up in Section VI. 
V.1  Large Current Account Deficits, Capital Mobility, CFCs, Exchange Rate 
Regimes and Contagion 
  Most emerging countries that suffered major crises during the 1990s and 2000s 
had run large current account imbalances.  Consider the following cases: In Mexico, the 
current account deficit averaged 7% of GDP during 1992-1994; deficits averaged 8.5% in 
Thailand during 1995-1996; and in Malaysia they averaged 7% in 1995-1996.  The recent 
surge in current account deficits in some advanced countries, such as the U.S. and New 
Zealand, has generated an interest in analyzing the role of large external imbalances in 
episodes of abrupt contractions in capital flows.  In order to address this issue I follow a 
two-part strategy:  First, I evaluate the estimated probability functions reported in Tables 
2-4 under two cases of current account imbalances:  “Moderate Deficits”  (2.0% of GDP) 
and “Large Deficits” (9.0% of GDP).   This allows me to investigate the way – and 
channels – through which large deficits affect the probability of a CFC.  In the second 
stage I analyze whether these estimates for “Moderate” and “Large” current account 
deficits change for two alternative degrees of capital mobility: Low, and High.
18 
  Table 6 presents the marginal effects and estimated probabilities of a CFC for 
countries with Moderate and Large current account deficits.
19  As may be seen, the 
estimated probability of a CFC increases from 14.3% in the Moderate Deficit case to 
21.9% under Large Deficits.  Notice that the benefits of a flexible exchange rate regime – 
captured by a negative marginal effect – are higher in countries with large current 
account deficits.  The marginal contribution of the current account deficit itself continues 
to be rather small, and it barely increases when moving from the Moderate to the Large 
deficits cases (it goes from 1.0% to 1.2%).   Contagion continues to play a significantly 
                                                            
18  I define Low and High mobility as above.  I don’t report the results for intermediate mobility in order not 
to clutter the analysis with an excessive number of combinations of deficits and capital mobility.  On the 
effects of large deficits see, for example, Freund and Warnock (2005). 
19 As before these marginal effects were computed using the estimated coefficients from equation (2.2) in 
Table 2.  “Typical” in this context means that these marginal effects and estimated probabilities have been 
evaluated at the mean values of all other covariates.              18 
positive effect.  Moreover, its marginal effect increases from 0.25% in the moderate 
deficits case, to 0.33% in the large deficits case.   
  The results reported in Table 6 are for a “typical” country with an average degree 
of capital mobility – the CM index is 56.7.  From the perspective of this paper, a 
particularly important question is whether the effects of large current account deficits are 
different under different degrees of capital mobility.  I address this issue by evaluating 
the probability function for four cases that combine the level of the current account 
deficit (Moderate and Large) with the degree of capital mobility (Low and High).
20  The 
results obtained are reported in Table 7.  As before, the largest marginal effects 
correspond to the exchange rate regime variable.  Its point estimate reaches the highest 
absolute value (9.7%) for the combination “large deficit-high capital mobility.”  Its 
lowest absolute value (5.4%) is for “moderate deficit-low capital mobility.”  Interestingly, 
the marginal effects of the capital mobility index don’t change under the different 
scenarios; they are 0.1% under all four estimates.  On the other hand, the marginal effects 
for both contagion and current account imbalances are highest under the “large deficit-
high capital mobility” estimate.   
V.2  Contagion:  Regional or Global? 
  In the results discussed above, “contagion” has a significantly positive effect on 
the probability of a CFC.  The contagion indicator used in these regressions was 
constructed as the proportion of countries in that specific region that had suffered a CFC; 
in that regard this is a measure of “regional contagion.”  An important question, however, 
is whether crises stemming from more distant regions also affect the probability of a 
CFC.  In order to address this issue I included in the regressions a second contagion 
variable as the incidence in CFCs (in that particular year) in other regions; I call this 
variable “Contagion Other.”  If contagion from distant places is an important determinant 
of the probability of a CFC, its estimated coefficient would be significantly positive.  The 
results obtained when this variable is added to the analysis are reported in Table 8, and 
indicate that once the incidence of “regional contagion” is taken into account, other crises 
                                                            
20 As before low capital mobility is defined as a value of the CM index of 12.5; High capital mobility 
corresponds to a value of the CM index at the 95
th percentile (100).          19 
– or non-regional contagion -- play no role in determining the probability of CFC.  This 
suggests that contagion is a regional phenomenon.   
V.3  Robustness and Extensions 
I performed standard robustness tests.  These included estimating the equations 
for alternative time periods, and alternative data sets.  I also considered alternative 
specifications, and included additional variables that (potentially) capture the extent of 
external imbalances.  Instrumental variables estimates are discussed in Section VI.  In the 
rest of this Sub-Section I discuss in detail some of the robustness tests performed.   
(A) Alternative Samples:  As an illustration of the degree of robustness of these 
results, in Table 9 I report variance component probit estimates for two sub-samples: 
emerging countries and “large” countries.
21  As may be seen, the results support the main 
conclusions that emerge from the analysis presented above.   
(B) Net International Investment Position: The results discussed above were 
obtained with a specification that considers the current account deficit as the fundamental 
measure of external imbalances; these results don’t control for the country’s initial net 
international investment position (NIIP).  When the value of the initial NIIP to GDP ratio 
was included as an additional regressor its coefficient was negative, as expected, 
indicating that a more positive NIIP would tend to reduce the probability of a CFC.  
However, the coefficient for this variable was statistically insignificant; see column 1 in 
Table 10.  Moreover, its inclusion did not affect in any way the analysis on marginal 
effects on probabilities.  
(C) CFCs with Windows:  In this paper a capital flow contraction episode takes 
place if net capital flows decline by more than 3% of GD in a particular year.  In 
constructing the CFC variable I did not use “windows” with no observations around each 
CFC; if capital flows declined by more than 3% of GDP for two years in a row, two 
successive CFCs were recorded.  As a way of further testing the robustness of the results, 
I re-estimated the variance component probit model using a CFC index constructed with 
a one year window.  The results obtained are reports in column 2 of Table 10.  As may be 
seen, the results support the main conclusions of the previous analysis. 
                                                            
21 Large countries are defined as those countries that in 1995 had a GDP in the top 25 percent of the global 
GDP distribution.           20 
  (D) CFCs with Alternative Thresholds:  As an additional robustness test I also 
considered alternative definitions of CFC.  In particular, I re-estimated the probits when a 
CFC was defined as being a 4% or 5% reduction in capital inflows in one year.  The 
results obtained – available on request – are similar to those reported here.   
(E) Sudden Stops as the Dependent Variable:  Throughout this paper the variable 
of interest has been capital flow contractions (CFCs), a very broad measure of capital 
changes in the capital account.  An interesting question is how the results look like when 
the more traditional concept of “sudden stops” is used as the dependent variable.  The 
results obtained when the definition of sudden stops given in Section II of this paper was 
used, are reported in the third column of Table 10.
22  As may be seen, the most important 
findings from the previous analysis still hold: the coefficients of the vast majority of 
covariates – including the capital mobility index, the current account deficit, contagion, 
the exchange rate regime and the foreign direct investment ratio – have the expected sign 
and are statistically significant.  
V.4    Alternative Specification of the Probit Equation: Multiplicative Covariates 
  In the probit specification used in the preceding Sections all covariates entered on 
their own.  Alternatively, some of the covariates could enter interactively.  This 
specification would provide information on the cross effect of one of the covariates on the 
probability of a CFC.  Consider the following simple case where  y is a dummy variable 
and the  i x are covariates:       
 
(5)    y  =    tj x x x x e b b b + + + 2 1 3 2 2 1 1 . 
 
The cross effect, which measures how a small change in  2 x  affects the marginal effect of 
1 x on the probability of  y , is given by:  
 
                                                            
22 Sudden Stops are defined as an abrupt reduction of capital inflows in a country previously receiving 
massive amount of capital.  In this paper the capital inflows reduction has to exceed 3% of GDP to classify 
as a SS.  Other papers, such as Edwards (2005), define SS as a reduction in capital flows in excess of 5% of 
GDP.         21 
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Where, as in equation (3), Fis the normal cumulative distribution;  ' F and  ' ' F are the 
first and second derivatives of F, evaluated at given values of the covariates.  Several 
interesting results emerge from this expression.  First, the cross marginal effect is not the 
same as the marginal effect of the interactive term.  Indeed, the marginal effect of 
) ( 2 1x x is given by  ) ( ' 3 × F b , which is only the first term in (6).
23  Second, even if the 
coefficient of the interactive variable  3 b is equal to zero, the cross effect in equation (4) 
will be different from zero.  Third, the actual magnitude of the cross effect will depend on 





 may be 
different from the sign of the regression coefficient for the interactive term  ) ( 2 1x x .    
  From the inspection of equation (5) it is easy to see that, in the presence of an 
interactive term, the marginal effect of  1 x  will be different than in the more standard case 
when there are no interactive terms (This, of course, is also the case for the marginal 
effect of  2 x ).  When there is an interactive effect, we have: 
 









  I estimated a number of fixed effects probit equations that included terms that 
interacted capital mobility and other covariates.  The results obtained confirmed those 
reported above: the marginal effects of all the covariates have the expected signs and the 
vast majority are statistically significant.  As an illustration, in Table 11 I present the 
marginal and cross effects from equations where I interacted the CM capital mobility 
index and the contagion variable.  In addition to CM and contagion I included the 
following covariates: current account deficit, exchange rate regime, changes in the terms 
of trade, world real interest rates, the FDI to GDP ratio, and regional dummies (the results 
                                                            
23 See Ali and Norton (2003) for a discussion on the role of interactive terms in probit analyses.        22 
presented  in Table 11, however, are restricted to the variables of interest).   The marginal 
and cross effects were evaluated for three sets of values for the capital mobility index:  
Low mobility (CM=12.5), Intermediate mobility (CM=56), High mobility (CM=100).  
All other covariates were set at their median values.  As may be seen, the results confirm 
that the direct marginal effects of capital mobility and contagion are positive, statistically 
significant and small.  In addition, the direct effect of contagion increases as the capital 






positive and very small, suggesting that a marginal increase in capital mobility increases 
the marginal effect of contagion by a very small amount.  Although z-statistics are  
greater than one, their p-values are higher than the customary .90 threshold.  
VI.  Instrumental Variable Estimates 
  As a number of authors have documented, international financial integration has 
increased significantly during the last decade and a half.  However, these changes in the 
extent of capital mobility have not been linear.  Indeed, there is evidence that, beyond the 
general trend towards liberalization, countries tend to alter the severity of capital controls 
for a number of political and economic reasons.
24  More specifically, countries that face 
external payments difficulties have tended to introduce restrictions on capital mobility.  
This means that it is possible that the capital mobility indexes used in this paper are 
endogenous, and jointly determined with (future) capital flow contractions.
25  In order to 
address this potential endogeneity issue I estimated the probit equation using maximum 
likelihood instrumental variables procedure suggested by Amemiya (1978).
26   
  In determining the instruments I relied on several findings from the empirical 
literature on capital controls:  (1) Capital mobility and trade openness are highly 
correlated.  This suggests that an exogenous measure of trade openness is a good 
                                                            
24  See, for example, the discussion in Alessina and Milesi-Ferreti (1994) for an early discussion on this 
subject. 
25  Although lagged capital mobility is a pre-determined variable, it may still be jointly determined with 
sudden stops if the error term e  in equation (2) is autoregressive. 
26  The identifying restrictions is that the number of instruments excluded from the main equation is equal 
or greater than the number of endogenous variables.            23 
instrument for capital mobility.
27  (2) Political considerations also play an important role 
in determining the extent of capital restrictions.  (3) More advanced countries tend to rely 
less on capital controls.  (4) Some countries respond to exogenous external shocks – such 
as changes in the terms of trade or in world (real) interest rates – by adjusting the degree 
of capital mobility.  Based on these considerations, in the instrumental variables 
estimation the following instruments were used: a measure of trade openness, obtained as 
the fitted value from a gravity model of bilateral trade; the lagged contagion indicator in 
other regions; a measure of civil liberties, as a proxy for political instability; lagged 
change in the terms of trade; twice lagged current account balance; lagged (real) world 
interest rates; the log of GDP per capita in 1970; and regional dummies.  The results 
obtained from the instrumental variables probit estimates are reported in Table 13.  The 
estimations reported are both for the complete sample as well as for an emerging 
countries only sample (where the z-tests were computed with robust standard errors).        
  As may be seen from Table 12, the results obtained are similar to those reported 
in Tables 2 and 3.  Coefficients continue to have the same signs and are most are 
statistically significant.  Moreover, the estimated marginal effects support the conclusions 
reached above:  increased capital results in a very small and significant increase in the 
probability of a CFC.  Countries that adopt a flexible exchange rate see a significant 
reduction in their probability of experiencing a CFC.  Contagion has a positive and 
significant effect on the probability of CFC.   
VII.  Concluding Remarks 
Previous works on restrictions on capital mobility and sudden declines in capital 
flows have been inconclusive: while some studies have found that higher mobility 
increases the probability of an abrupt decline in capital flows, others have failed to detect 
a significant connection between these two variables.  In contrast, the results presented in 
this paper indicate that higher capital mobility has a positive, statistically significant and 
small direct effect on the probability of a country experiencing an abrupt contraction of 
net capital inflows.  Two factors explain these differences in results: first, in this paper I 
have focused on rather broad definitions of capital account contractions, while previous 
                                                            
27   As Aizenman and Noy (2004) have shown, there is a strong empirical connection between trade 
openness and the degree of capital mobility.  The use of gravity trade equations to generate instruments in 
panel estimation has been pioneered by Jeff Frankel.  See, for example, Frankel and Cavallo (2004).        24 
papers have tended to focus on more stringent (and thus less frequent) situations of 
sudden stops.  Second, in this paper I use more general and complete indexes of capital 
mobility.  In principle these indexes capture better the granularity and texture of capital 
account restrictions across countries. 
It is important, however, not to exaggerate the implications of the findings 
reported in this paper.  Indeed, although the direct effects of capital mobility on the 
probability of capital account contractions are significantly positive, they are 
quantitatively very small.  The point estimate of the marginal effects of capital mobility 
on the probability of a CFC is approximately 0.1%, and very stable for different values of 
the vector of covariates.   
Although the direct effect of capital mobility on the probability of CFCs is small, 
there is a fairly important indirect effect.  This is particularly the case for the exchange 
rate regime.  The marginal effect a adopting a flexible rate regime on the probability of a 
CFC is more negative – and always significant -- for higher degrees of capital mobility.  
The marginal effect of contagion is significantly negative, and increases with the degree 
of capital mobility.  The point estimates are rather small, however.      
The results reported in this paper also indicate that a higher current account deficit 
results in a higher probability of a capital flow contraction, while a higher ratio of FDI to 
GDP reduces that probability.  Lower worldwide liquidity increases the probability, and 
being an advanced country reduces that probability. 
    Finally, it is important to reiterate that the results reported here only cover one 
aspect of the debate on capital mobility and financial integration – whether controls affect 
the probability of facing a CFC, and the channels through which these effects take place.  
A complete analysis of the welfare implications of restricting capital mobility would also 
focus on other consequences and costs of these policies, including its effect on 
investment, productivity growth, governance, transparency and microeconomic 
distortions.  Such a study is beyond the scope of this paper.           25 
Appendix 
Description of the Data 
 
Variable  Definition  Source 
     
Indexes of capital 
mobility 
Indexes  Author’s construction based on 
indexes of capital restrictions 
computed by Quinn (2003) and 
Mody and Murshid (2002), and 
on country specific data, Lane 
and Milesi-Ferreti (2006) and 
Miniane (2004) 
     
Capital flow 
contractions (CFC) 
Reduction in net capital flows of at 
least 3% of GDP in one year. Initial 
condition could be one of positive or 
negative net flows. 
Author’s construction based on 
data of current account deficit 
(World Development Indicators) 
     
Sudden Stop  Reduction of net capital inflows of at 
least 3% of GDP in one year. The 
country in question must have 
received an inflow of capital larger to 
its region’s third quartile during the 
previous two years prior to the 
“sudden stop.”   
Author’s construction based on 
data of financial account (World 
Development Indicators) 
     
Change in terms of 
trade 
Change in terms of trade-exports as 
capacity to import (constant LCU) 
World Development Indicators 
     
Reserves to 
Liabilities  
Net international reserves over total 
external liabilities 
Constructed from data in Lane 
and Milesi-Ferreti (2006) 
     
Exchange Rate 
Regime 
Takes a value of one if the de facto 
regime is flexible 
Levy-Yeyati and Stuzenegger 
(2003) 
     
Contagion  Incidence of CFCs in the country’s 
region or reference group 
Constructed by author.  
     
FDI to GDP  Ratio of FDI to GDP  World Development Indicators 
     
World interest rates  Real US Treasury notes rates  Computed from data obtained 
from the IFS 
     
Current account to 
GDP 
Measured as a deficit  World Development Indicators 
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Table 1 
Title: Incidence of Sudden Stops, 1970-2004 
 
         
  CAPITAL FLOW 
CONTRACTIONS 
SUDDEN STOPS 
  No CFC  CFC  No Sudden 
Stops 
Sudden Stops 
         
Industrial Countries  0.8852  0.1148  0.9438  0.0562 
Latin American and Caribbean  0.7801  0.2199  0.8883  0.1117 
Asia  0.8634  0.1366  0.9317  0.0683 
Africa  0.8003  0.1997  0.9198  0.0802 
Middle East  0.7426  0.2574  0.8713  0.1287 
Eastern Europe  0.7561  0.2439  0.8943   
          
Total  0.8118  0.1882  0.9128  0.0872 
         
Observations  2030      2030 
Pearson         
Uncorrected  c
2(5)  27.9304      13.3663 
Design-based  F(5,18210)  5.5833      2.61719 
p-value  0.0000      0.0203        28 
Table 2 
Random Effect Probit Estimates for Capital flow contractions, 1970-2004: 
Capital Mobility (CM) Index of International Financial Integration 
 
 
  Eq.(2.1)  Eq.(2.2)  Eq.(2.3)  Eq.(2.4)  Eq.(2.5)  Eq.(2.6) 
             
CAD to GDP  0.036  0.042  0.043  0.051  0.043  -- 
  (9.4) ***  (9.12) ***  (7.23) ***  (9.28)***  (7.18)***   
Contagion  0.008  0.011  0.011  .0011  0.014  0.009 
  (2.53) **  (3.04) ***  (2.61) ***  (2.92)***  (3.36)***  (2.37) ** 
Terms of Trade Change  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.005 
  (-1.69) *  (-1.58)   (-1.06)   (-1.29)  (-1.34)  (-2.16) ** 
Advanced  -0.225  -0.122  -0.126  -0.159  -0.092  -0.318 
  (-1.94) *  (-0.95)   (-0.9)   (-1.14)  (-0.65)  (-2.27) ** 
Capital Mobility  0.005  0.004  0.004  0.006  0.005  0.004 
  (3.07) ***  (2.41) **  (2.24) **  (2.96)***  (2.42)***  (2.05) ** 
World Interest Rate  0.033  0.035  0.040  0.035  0.024  0.032 
  (2.29) **  (1.89) *  (1.98) **  (1.85)*  (1.91)*  (1.61)  
Flexible  --  -0.304  -0.283  -0.296  -0.338  -0.301 
    (-3.37) ***  (-2.95) ***  (-3.2)***  (-3.5)***  (-3.17) *** 
Fiscal Deficit to GDP  --  --  0.008  --  --  0.021 
      (1.03)       (2.86) *** 
FDI to GDP  --  --  --  -0.032  --  -- 
        (-3.5)***     
Reserves to Liabilities  --  --  --  --  0.001  -- 
          (0.19)   
             
Log – Likelihood  -1389.30  -895.82  -726.59  -855.229  -745.048  -754.69 
sn  0.315  0.225  0.262  0.283  0.278  0.279 
r  0.090  0.048  0.064  0.074  0.072  0.072 
Likelihood-ratio test of r 
=0  
(p - value) 




0.001  0.001 
             
Number of Observations  3009  2030  1671  1974  1179  1671 
Number of Countries  150  136  121  130  115  121 
 
Absolute  value  of  z  statistics  is  reported  in  parentheses.  All  regressors  are  one  period  lagged. 
Constant term is included, but not reported. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant 
at 10%. r is s
2
n  /( s
2
n + 1). 
          29 
Table 3 
Random Effect Probit Estimates for Capital flow contractions, 1970-2004: 
LMF Index of International Financial Integration 
 
 
  Eq.(3.1)  Eq.(3.2)  Eq.(3.3)  Eq.(3.4)  Eq.(3.5)  Eq.(3.6) 
             
CAD to GDP  0.033  0.041  0.046  0.049  0.042  -- 
  (6.82) ***  (7.05) ***  (6.2) ***  (7.33)***  (7.05)***   
Contagion  0.009  0.013  1.268  0.013  0.013  0.012 
  (2.72) ***  (3.3) ***  (2.97) ***  (3.04)***  (3.32)***  (2.87) *** 
Terms of Trade Change  -0.002  -0.003  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002  -0.003 
  (-0.89)   (-1.23)   (-0.37)   (-0.89)  (-1.22)  (-1.19)  
Advanced  -0.126  0.035  0.052  0.008  0.041  -0.125 
  (-1.07)   (0.27)   (0.38)   (0.06)  (0.32)  (-0.95)  
LMF  0.061  0.043  0.047  0.002  0.001  0.041 
  (3.42) ***  (2.12) **  (2.23) **  (2.87)***  (2.17)***  (2.05) ** 
World Interest Rate  0.028  0.018  0.028  0.017  0.019  0.021 
  (1.8) *  (0.9)   (1.28)   (0.80)  (0.96)  (1.00)  
Flexible  --  -0.332  -0.311  0.319  0.331  -0.313 
    (-3.4) ***  (-3.1)***   (-3.3)***  (-3.4)***  (-3.1)***  
Fiscal Deficit to GDP  --  --  0.005  --  --  0.019 
      (0.54)       (2.09) ** 
FDI to GDP  --  --  --  -0.029  --  -- 
        (-2.8)***     
Reserves to Liabilities  --  --  --  --  0.001  -- 
          (0.47)   
             
             
Log – Likelihood  -1155.83  -745.92  -640.02  -722.296  -745.814  -661.23 
sn  0.343  0.267  0.297  0.307  0.265  0.286 
r  0.105  0.066  0.081  0.086  0.086  0.065 
Likelihood-ratio test of r 
=0  
(p - value) 




0.001  0.001 
             
Number of Observations  2620  1769  1528  1743  1769  1528 
Number of Countries  126  115  105  111  115  105 
 
Absolute  value  of  z  statistics  is  reported  in  parentheses.  All  regressors  are  one  period  lagged. 
Constant term is included, but not reported. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant 
at 10%. r is s
2
n  /( s
2
n + 1).        30 
Table 4 
Random Effect Probit Estimates for Capital flow contractions, 1970-2004: 
MI Index of International Financial Integration 
 
 
  Eq.(4.1)  Eq.(4.2)  Eq.(4.3)  Eq.(4.3)  Eq.(4.3)  Eq.(4.6) 
             
CAD to GDP  0.043  0.051  0.050  0.052  0.060  -- 
  (1.94) *  (2.00) **  (1.95) *  (2. 5) **  (2. 4) **   
Contagion  0.011  0.017  0.016  0.017  0.018  0.014 
  (1.2)   (1.64)   (1.59)   (1.67)*   (1.75)*   (1.36)  
Terms of Trade Change  0.017  0.009  0.008  0.006  0.006  0.005 
  (1.77) *  (0.79)   (0.72)   (0.77)   (0.57)   (0.45)  
Advanced  -0.650  -0.592  -0.596  -0.585  -0.565  -0.674 
  (-1.84) *  (-1.65) *  (-1.63)*   (-1.77)*   (-1.71)*   (-1.86) * 
Miniane Index  -0.922  -0.961  -0.988  -0.911  -1.331  -0.886 
  (-1.98) **  (-1.89) *  (-1.9) *  (-1.8) *  (-2.6) **  (-1.72) * 
World Interest Rate  -0.020  -0.017  -0.015  -0.018  0.057  -0.014 
  (-0.3)   (-0.24)   (-0.22)   (-0.26)   (0.57)   (-0.2)  
Flexible  --  -0.590  -0.584  -0.590  -0.579  -0.515 
    (-2.7) ***  (-2.7) ***  (-2.8) ***  (-2.8) **  (-2.4) ** 
Fiscal Deficit to GDP  --  --  0.0001  --  --  -0.003 
      (0.01)       (-0.14)  
FDI to GDP  --  --  --  0.013  --  -- 
        (0.50)     
Reserves to Liabilities  --  --  --  --  0.046  -- 
          (1.85) *   
             
             
Log – Likelihood  181.15  -147.95  -146.35  -147.83  -140.75  -148.30 
sn  0.557  0.471  0.454  0.458  0.342  0.455 
r  0.237  0.182  0.171  0.174  0.105  0.172 
Likelihood-ratio test of r =0  
(p - value) 
0.000  0.002  0.006  0.004  0.040  0.005 
             
Number of Observations  516  448  423  448  448  423 
Number of Countries  30  30  28  30  30  28 
 
Absolute  value  of  z  statistics  is  reported  in  parentheses.  All  regressors  are  one  period  lagged. 
Constant term is included, but not reported. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant 
at 10%. r is s
2
n  / (s
2
n + 1).        31 
Table 5 
Marginal Effects and Predicted Probabilities of Capital flow contractions 
Under Alternative Degrees of Capital Mobility 
 
 






       
  Eq.(5.1)  Eq.(5.2)  Eq.(5.3) 
       
CAD to GDP  0.009  0.010  0.012 
  (7.00) ***  (9.03) ***  (7.88) *** 
Contagion  0.00229  0.00279  0.00329 
  (2.96) ***  (3.04) ***  (2.97) *** 
Terms of Trade Change  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (-1.57)   (-1.58)   (-1.56)  
Advanced  -0.024  -0.029  -0.035 
  (-1.03)   (-0.99)   (-0.96)  
Capital Mobility  0.001  0.001  0.001 
  (3.08) ***  (2.42) **  (2.11) ** 
World Interest Rate  0.007  0.009  0.01 
  (1.87) *  (1.89) *  (1.88) * 
Flexible  -0.057  -0.07  -0.084 
  (-3.40) ***  (-3.63) ***  (-3.54) *** 
       
       
Predicted Probability  0.123  0.165  0.216 
 
For details on the computations in each column,  see the text.  Absolute  value of z statistics are 
reported  in  parentheses.  Sample  means  are:  4.3  for  current  account  deficit  to  GDP,  0.196  for 
contagion, 4.3 for changes in terms of trade, 0.21 for advance, 2.06 for world interest rate and 0.263 
for flex. Capital mobility is set at 12.5, 56 and 100 in Eq.(5.1), Eq.(5.2) and Eq.(5.3) respectively.       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        32 
 
Table 6 
Marginal Effects and Predicted Probabilities of Capital flow contractions 
Under Alternative levels of the Current Account Deficit 
 
 




     
  Eq.(6.1)  Eq.(6.2) 
     
CAD to GDP  0.009  0.012 
  (9.86) ***  (7.97) *** 
Contagion  0.00253  0.00331 
  (3.04) ***  (3.04) *** 
Terms of Trade Change  -0.001*  -0.001* 
  (-1.57)   (-1.58)  
Advanced  -0.027  -0.035 
  (-0.99)   (-0.99)  
Capital Mobility  0.001  0.001 
  (2.41) **  (2.41) ** 
World Interest Rate  0.008  0.010 
  (1.89) *  (1.89) * 
Flexible  -0.063  -0.085 
  (-3.63) ***  (-3.61) *** 
     
     
Predicted Probability  0.143  0.219 
 
For details on the computations in each column,  see the text.  Absolute  value of z statistics are 
reported in parentheses. Sample means are: 0.196 for contagion, 4.3 for changes in terms of trade, 
0.21 for advance, 56.7 for capital mobility, 2.06 for world interest rate and 0.263 for flex. Current 
account  deficit  to  GDP  is  set  at  2.0  in  Eq.(6.1)  and  9.0  in  Eq.(6.2).  *  significant  at  10%;  ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        33 
Table 7 
Marginal Effects and Predicted Probabilities of Capital flow contractions 
Under Alternative Degrees of Capital Mobility and of Current Account Deficits 
 
 




         












         
  Eq.(7.1)  Eq.(7.2)  Eq.(7.3)  Eq.(7.4) 
`         
CAD to GDP  0.008  0.011  0.011  0.014 
  (8.25) ***  (8.08) ***  (7.3) ***  (7.63) *** 
Contagion  0.00217  0.00303  0.00295  0.00376 
  (3.00) ***  (2.96) ***  (3.02) ***  (2.99) *** 
Terms of Trade Change  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (-1.57)   (-1.56)   (-1.58)   (-1.57)  
Advanced  -0.023  -0.032  -0.031  -0.04 
  (-1.02)   (-0.96)   (-1.01)   (-0.96)  
Capital Mobility  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
  (2.88) ***  (2.08) **  (2.74) ***  (2.17) ** 
World Interest Rate  0.007  0.009  0.009  0.012 
  (1.88) *  (1.87) *  (1.89) *  (1.88) * 
Flexible  -0.054  -0.077  -0.075  -0.097 
  (-3.48) ***  (-3.53) ***  (-3.54) ***  (-3.54) *** 
         
         
Predicted Probability  0.114  0.188  0.181  0.278 
 
For details on the computations in each column,  see the text.  Absolute  value of z statistics are 
reported in parentheses. Sample means are: 0.196 for contagion, 4.3 for changes in terms of trade, 
0.21 for advance, 2.06 for world interest rate and 0.263 for flex. Current account deficit to GDP is 
set at 2.0 in Eq.(7.1) and Eq.(7.2), and at 9.0 in Eq.(7.3) and Eq.(7.4). Capital Mobility is set at 25 in 
Eq.(7.1) and Eq.(7.3), and at 100 in Eq.(7.2) and Eq.(7.4). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1% 
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Table 8 
Random Effect Probit Estimates for Capital flow contractions, 1970-2004, 
Under Two Alternative Definitions of Contagion (Regional and Other) 
 
 
     
  Eq.(8.1)  Eq.(8.2) 
     
CAD to GDP  0.042  0.0414 
  (9.11) ***  (7.05) *** 
Contagion Regional  0.0117  0.0136 
  (3.15) ***  (3.34) *** 
Contagion Other  -0.8235  -0.4102 
  (-1.23)   (-0.58)  
Terms of Trade Change  -0.003  -0.0025 
  (-1.59)   (-1.23)  
Advanced  -0.0999  0.0469 
  (-0.77)   (0.36)  
World Interest Rate  0.0431  0.0221 
  (2.19) **  (1.04)  
Flexible  -0.3055  -0.3323 
  (-3.38) ***  (-3.44) *** 
Capital Mobility  0.0044  -- 
  (2.45) **   
LMF  --  0.0429 
    (2.14) ** 
     
Log – Likelihood  -895.0618  -745.7535 
sn  0.227  0.267 
r  0.049  0.067 
Likelihood-ratio test of r =0  
(p - value)  0.007  0.002 
     
Number of Observations  2030  1769 
Number of Countries  136  115 
 
Absolute  value  of  z  statistics  is  reported  in  parentheses.  All  regressors  are  one  period  lagged. 
Constant term is included, but not reported. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant 
at 10%. r is s
2
n  / (s
2
n + 1). 
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Table 9 
Random Effect Probit Estimates for Capital flow contractions, 1970-2004, 
For Alternative Samples:  Emerging (and Transition) Countries and Large Countries 
 
 
  Emerging Countries  Large Countries 
         
  Eq.(9.1)  Eq. (9.2)  Eq. (9.3)  Eq. (9.4) 
         
CAD to GDP  0.043  0.043  0.046  0.05 
  (9.20) ***  (7.10) ***  (2.92) ***  (3.16) *** 
Contagion  0.0119  0.0142  0.0139  0.0152 
  (3.13) ***  (3.37) ***  (2.21) **  (2.39) ** 
Terms of Trade Change  -0.004  -0.003  0.001  0.001 
  (-1.86) *  (-1.49)   (0.19)   (0.17)  
World Interest Rate  0.036  0.016  0.043  0.033 
  (1.75) *  (0.72)   (1.37)   (1.03)  
Flexible  -0.236  -0.274  -0.332  -0.326 
  (-2.35) **  (-2.49) **  (-2.36) **  (-2.33) ** 
Advanced  --  --  -0.281  -0.152 
      (-1.39)   (-0.91)  
Capital Mobility  0.005  --  0.005  -- 
  (2.60) ***    (1.54)    
LMF  --  0.036  --  0.132 
    (1.70) *    (2.32) ** 
         
Log – Likelihood  -746.69  -598.62  -300.37  -294.57 
sn  0.190  0.254  0.299  0.257 
r  0.035  0.061  0.082  0.062 
Likelihood-ratio test of r =0  
(p - value)  0.051  0.010  0.020  0.072 
         
Number of Observations  1603  1342  789  783 
Number of Countries  115  94  43  42 
 
Absolute  value  of  z  statistics  is  reported  in  parentheses.  All  regressors  are  one  period  lagged. 
Constant term is included, but not reported. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant 




n + 1). 
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Table 10 
Random Effect Probit Estimates for Capital flow contractions and Sudden Stops, 1970-2004: 
Alternative Definitions of Capital Flows Declines  
 
       
       
  Dependent Variable: 
 
CFC   CFC 
w/windows  Sudden Stops 
  Eq.(10.1)  Eq.(10.2)  Eq.(10.3) 
       
       
CAD to GDP  0.051  0.052  0.071 
  (6.89)***  (8.23) ***  (10.04) *** 
Contagion Regional  0.013  0.0116  0.0105 
  (3.24)***  (2.77) ***  (2.15) ** 
Terms of Trade Change  -0.002  -0.003  -0.0025 
  (-1.01)  (-1.00)   (-1.01)  
Advanced  -0.92  -0.0835  0.195 
  (-0.61)  (-0.55)   (1.11)  
World Interest Rate  0.022  0.0238  0.0221 
  (1.70)*  (1.88) *  (1.04)  
Flexible  -0.323  -0.3161  -0.3323 
  (-3.31)***  (-3.08) ***  (-3.44) *** 
Capital Mobility  0.006  0.0053  0.005 
  (2.86)***  (2.47) ***  (2.00)** 
NIIP  -0.001  --  -- 
  (-0.97)     
FDI to GDP  --  -0.306  -0.002 
    (-3.23)***  (-2.73)*** 
       
Log – Likelihood  -721.785  -716.252  -484.350 
sn  0.327  0.315  0.334 
r  0.097  0.090  0.100 
Likelihood-ratio test of r =0  
(p - value) 
 
0.000  0.000  0.002 
       
Number of Observations  1743  1663  1974 
Number of Countries  111  130  130 
 
Absolute  value  of  z  statistics  is  reported  in  parentheses.  All  regressors  are  one  period  lagged. 
Constant term is included, but not reported. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant 
at 10%. r is s
2
n  / (s
2
n + 1). 
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Table 11 
Marginal and Cross Effects of Capital flow contractions Equations 
 with Interactive Covariates:  Alternative Degrees of Capital Mobility 
 
 






       
  Eq.(11.1)  Eq.(11.2)  Eq.(11.3) 
       
Capital Mobility  0.001  0.001  0.001 
  (3.17) ***  (2.51) **  (2.24) ** 
Contagion  0.001  0.0025  0.0054 
  (2.73) **  (2.39) **  (2.52) * 
Cross Effect  0.000041  0.00004  0.00006 
  (1.61)   (1.09)   (1.56)  
       
       
Predicted Probability  0.125  0.164  0.208 
 
For details on the computations in each column,  see the text.  Absolute  value of z statistics are 
reported  in  parentheses.  Sample  means  are:  4.3  for  current  account  deficit  to  GDP,  0.196  for 
contagion, 4.3 for changes in terms of trade, 0.21 for advance, 2.06 for world interest rate and 0.263 
for flex. Capital mobility is set at 12.5, 56 and 100 in Eq.(5.1), Eq.(5.2) and Eq.(5.3) respectively.       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        38 
Table 12 
Random Effect Probit Estimates for Capital flow contractions, 1970-2004, 
Results from Instrumental Variables (IVPROB)  
 
  All Countries  Emerging Countries 
         
  Eq.(12.1)  Eq.( 12.2)  Eq.( 12.3)  Eq.( 12.4) 
         
CA to GDP  0.048  0.049  0.045  0.048 
  (8.57) ***  (8.34) ***  (6.50) ***  (6.33) *** 
Contagion  0.0131  0.0129  0.0125  0.0145 
  (3.31) ***  (3.17) ***  (3.36) ***  (3.37) *** 
World Interest Rate  0.027  0.027  0.004  0.005 
  (1.45)   (1.25)   (0.2)   (0.23)  
Terms of Trade Change  -0.004  -0.005  -0.003  -0.004 
  (-1.62)   (-2.13) **  (-1.04)   (-1.45)  
Flexible  -0.362  -0.236  -0.306  -0.239 
  (-3.99) ***  (-2.21) **  (-3.28) ***  (-2.15) ** 
Capital Mobility  0.006  0.012  --  -- 
  (2.24) **  (2.16) **     
LMF  --  --  0.173  0.132 
      (3.78) ***  (2.97) *** 
         
         
         
Number of Observations  1735  1308  1590  1163 
 
Absolute  value  of  z  statistics  is  reported  in  parentheses.  All  regressors  are  one  period  lagged. 
Constant term is included, but not reported. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant 
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